

**The role of National parliaments in the EU after Lisbon through the control of subsidiarity:
Study of the British, French, German, Italian and Spanish cases**

In my PhD, I take a look at whether the introduction of the subsidiarity check has led to a gain of power or at least a change in the role of five National Parliaments in EU matters within their National institutional systems and within the institutional system of the EU in general.

In fact, the control of the respect of the principle of subsidiarity was introduced to help remedy the problem of the democratic deficit of the European Union by implicating directly National Parliaments in its legislative process.

However, the effectiveness of the Early Warning System may be questioned. Firstly because of its own features that make the proper preparation of National Parliaments beforehand a prerequisite. Secondly, an effective coordination among the Chambers for the Yellow or the Orange Card to be activated is necessary, and it appears that none of these requirements are currently sufficiently met by a majority of National Parliaments. On top of this, one can argue that the existence itself of the EWS is already a threat for the European Commission which will, in general, be less tempted to make controversial proposals.

Still, it appears that almost three years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EWS – and to some extent other prerogatives introduced by the Lisbon Treaty – have in my view indeed had a positive impact on the role of National Parliaments in EU matters within their internal institutional system and that of the EU.

For instance, even in countries in which the Parliament long had means of information and control over their government in EU affairs, such as Germany for instance, they were poorly used. With the EWS nevertheless this long-lasting tendency has begun to change, that is to say that there is an increased interest in EU matters – or, in some cases, the beginning thereof -. Apart from this, the Lisbon Treaty, and especially the EWS, have led to an extension of these prerogatives.

Thus it seems to me that the EWS ought to be analyzed rather as a detonator than for its own sake since its introduction has undoubtedly led National parliaments to become aware of their role in EU matters and to be willing to control more steadily their Government's action in this field.

Of course, the mechanisms put into place by the Member States are far from being perfect, especially regarding the articulation between the Regional and the National levels, but the progress made should be acknowledged. And so should the role of the EWS as stimulus for a greater role of National Parliaments in EU matters, even if this result does not match with the original purpose of the EWS.