Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to You with reference to the Master thesis Award of the Montesquieu Institute for 2011.

I have recently graduated with honours (Cum Laude) in Public Administration at University of Twente (with a full MTEC scholarship awarded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and one of my supervisors encouraged me to apply for 2011 Master Thesis Award. Currently, I am working with Professor Robert Hoppe, who was my first thesis supervisor and Educational Programme Director BSc and MSc Public Administration, on transforming it in an article for an international scientific journal.

Enclosed hereafter, I hand You a copy of the thesis.

In conclusion, I do hope my research interests are commensurate with the profile of the suitable applicant and that You will look favourably on my application.

Thank You in advance for Your consideration of my application. I appreciate Your taking the time to read it and I look forward to meeting You in the near future.

Yours Faithfully,

Yana Stoeva
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School of Management and Governance
MSc degree program in Public Administration

MASTER THESIS
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Title: The rhetorical entrapment of the EU in the discourse of the 5th Eastward enlargement, the case of Bulgaria and Romania

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCING THE STORY:
THE PUZZLE OF THE EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT – AGENDA-SETTING DOES MATTER

1.1. WHAT

1.1.1. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

Once upon a time, I was Eastern European. Then I was promoted to Central European. …There was a dream of Central Europe, a vision of its future... Then a couple of months ago, I became a New European...

Péter Esterházy, 2003

The purpose of this thesis is to tell a story, the never-ending story of European identity, its interactive relationship to the enlargement project, construction and reconstruction through narratives. The way I choose to go about developing this story is by starting with a personal narrative that will equip the reader with some background information in making sense of this text.

The story of this thesis began with a research challenge, further back in time when I had an assignment to make about the Eastern enlargement, I remember grappling with the puzzle it poses before the dominant integration theory, namely Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism (1993). Thus, I entered the task full of questions, one more specific – are the problems just ‘out there’ ready to be discovered, as Moravcsik holds it, or are they socially constructed?

At that point, I started searching for the missing pieces of the puzzle, a theoretical concept or framework to help me organise and make sense of the competing enlargement discourses. To answer this question, time and again, I was tempted to turn to the convenient book shelf of statistics and ‘empirical facts’ that claim for ‘objectivity’. However, it appeared that the EU negotiations are not just about ‘hard facts’ and numbers but also, and even more so, about uncovering meaning in the data, in finding the dominating stories that underwrite and stabilise the issue (Roe, 1994).

By framing the entire question of negotiation outcome in terms of two variables – the pre-fixed preferences of utility maximising member states and their bargaining power vis-à-vis the candidate states, Moravcsik seems to turn a blind eye to the pre-negotiation phase where the agenda-setting and the way the problems are framed is determined. The author skips ‘probably the most important activity performed by policy analysts’ (Dunn, 2008), namely – problem structuring.

Hence, Moravcsik could be condemned for turning the process of problem structuring and problem solving upside down. Most strikingly, in the enlargement decision the governments were largely uncertain about their preferences in the very first place. Ergo, by using lower-order methods of problem solving to solve such a complex problem, the analyst commits the commonest error of the third kind. The fact that the higher-order methods of problem structuring, the so-called metamethods are ‘about’ and ‘come before’ the lower-order methods of problem solving (Dunn, 2008).
In general, people tend to take for granted that there is an objective and pre-existing reality, because over time, the process of problem structuration becomes automatic and usually unconscious. Thus, without realising it, by formulating the problem the way he did, Moravcsik shaped how the issue was defined implying certain directions for its solution. In his eyes, the author had a structured problem before himself that permitted the usage of conventional methods. However, bearing in mind the conflicting position of the other stakeholders, the values and utilities they held, the problem itself became problematic and the challenge lays elsewhere – in structuring the metaproblem of the eastward enlargement. This is where the usefulness of the narrative analytical approaches comes into play, allowing the reformulation of increasingly intractable problems to make them more amendable to the conventional policy analytical approaches (Roe, 1994).

Moreover, the case of the eastward enlargement provides a particularly rich case of environment characterised by limited knowledge and imperfect understanding, where uncertainty is the norm rather than the exception. Thus, drawing upon Rein and Schön, the way a certain problem is framed is potentially influential, since framing a problem in a particular way is an activity of selection, organisation and interpretation of a complex reality that ‘provides guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading and acting’ (Rein & Schön, 1991).

The solution I come up with, in the end is, instead of naively believing that the most sophisticated quantitative techniques would surely solve the most complex problems with the ‘toolkit of statistics, microeconomics, organization theory, and legal analysis’ (Roe, 1994), to adopt a narrative analytical viewpoint with hermeneutic, interpretive focus rather than a positivist one.

I intend to demonstrate this idea with the case study of Bulgaria and Romania since they form a useful comparative set, based on their rather similar but not identical negotiation discourses, recent history and difference from the ‘2004 accession class’ and among each other. In this respect, the way the actors made use of the language as a medium of political rhetoric, rather than describing ‘given’ social reality, becomes problematized.

By so doing, I hope to link the concept of narrative, as a mean to construct European identity, to that of enlargement, and study how the EU ended up trapped in the gridlock of its own founding myth and pan-European rhetoric of a membership open to ‘any European state’ that respects the founding values and principles of the Union.

A closing remark for this section is a front line experience that the end of this personal narrative is just the beginning of writing about the story of the eastward enlargement.

1.1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION

After having defined the problem and explained its background, it is time to move on and raise the fundamental questions that provoked this study.

The key question to be confronted in the research herewith presented is:

**What are the mechanisms underlying the dialectical relationship between European identity ↔ Narratives ↔ Eastward Enlargement?**
As sub-questions, the argument will revolve around answering the questions of:

- How identity and boundaries (lines of inclusion/exclusion) are related?
- How did the actors’ framing of the enlargement process affect the ‘negotiation game’?

The thesis, which I advocate is that in pursuit of the answers to the questions posed above I will be able to direct the attention to the identity narratives that underpin the European values and consequently the enlargement discourse. Comprehending Europe merely in terms of statistical data or distances in kilometres would not suffice, for Europe is as much a phenomenon of the mind as it is a reality, an ‘imagined community’, to borrow the concept coined by Anderson (1995).

Although in sheer numbers of kilometres the distance between the ‘old’ and ‘new Europe’ remains the same, after the enlargement one gets the impression that Europe is brought closer together. Analogous example of such a heuristic-induced bias is when we overestimate the distances on foggy days and underestimate them on clear days (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000).

Nowhere could that be seen better than in Berlin, where with the fall of the wall, the artificial divide that cut Europe through its heart, is gone and once the restricted crossing of the border at the corner of Friedrichstraße station, Checkpoint Charlie has come to be a ‘picture point’.

This demonstrates the transient nature of the boundaries that once were a surmountable barrier, not in space but in mental distance, and serves to point in direction of the ‘frame battle’ in the enlargement discourse. One major line in this shift of the discursive border Europe/non-Europe is the way each East European state frame the ‘Other’ as further east their border and hence, position oneself into Europe. Garton Ash, aptly captures the fuzziness of the Europe’s frontier when he once mused: ‘Tell me your Central Europe, and I tell you who you are’ (1999).

1.2. HOW

1.2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this research, I draw upon the Social Identity Theory (SIT), which holds that the strength of the European identity is the key variable in explaining the enlargement policy toward applicant countries. Researchers recognise the fact that the stronger the members identify with the group, the less likely they are to support the inclusion of an outsider (Curley, 2009).

Thus, the criteria for an out-group member to join the group would be stricter the stronger the members’ sense of belonging to the group. The hypotheses is that the in-group members will insist on provision of more than just rational benefits for inclusion, because the applicants must also prove ‘likeness’ to the group’s identity. This explains why rational theories in isolation will fail to account for the EU expansion.

In the light of the above mentioned, scholars advocate that people are more willing to open up to new identity-challenging information and more inclined to evaluate ideas otherwise threatening to their identity if they are allowed to confirm their overall sense
of self-integrity (Cohen et al., 2007). Hence, based on these argumentations, it could be predicted that the enlargement would be possible as more than a mere give-and-take negotiation of utility maximising member states in a greater social dimension when values as an important unit are in congruency. Ironically, it seems that the building of an inclusive Europe will require from the individuals to weaken their European identity to allow applicants to join the group.

Bearing in mind the lack of agreement on the relevant knowledge, the disagreement in the value scheme about the possible solutions, their impact on the institutional balance, the common agricultural policy CAP, the social policy and the EU as a whole, applying narrative epistemology to the analysis of the enlargement debate is a pertinent point to consider. Indeed, the high uncertainty and complexity that surrounded the EU negotiations made it difficult for the governments to define their preferences and narrow down the uncertainty. Precisely because of this, the agenda setting and problem framing played a substantial role in the pre-negotiation phase where the use of competing frames influenced the negotiations outcome.

Following the same line of reasoning, the importance of language in not only describing but creating the world out there will be considered a starting point in this research, in that language does not simply mirror the world, but instead shapes our view of it in the first place (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Roe, 1994).

Come to think of it, the very term ‘enlargement’ already frames the process as a one-way exercise implying a need for action, provoking immediate emotions and denoting others. The demand for enlargement stems also from its availability, the very existence of the possibility to enlarge begets the necessity to do so and is the first step in promoting change.

1.2.2. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Based on the theory hitherto discussed, a synoptic view of the dialectical relationship between European identity, its construction through narratives, and the Eastward enlargement is presented in the graphic below:

![Figure 1: Identity ↔ Narrative ↔ Enlargement: A dialectical and relational approach.](image)

The rationale behind this graphic and the use of the term ‘dialectical’ is that there is no simple one-way relationship between identity, narrative and enlargement on the
one hand, and structure, agent and action(s) on the other, but rather, following Marsh and Smith’s ‘dialectical approach’, each affects the other in a continuing iterative process. (2000)

It is through narratives that we constitute our social identities and make sense of the world. Narratives, thus, embed identities and struggle over narratives is struggle over identities, since they articulate social realities (Somers, 1994).

Furthermore, people act because of who they are, as not to do so would fundamentally violate their sense of personal integrity, not because of rational utility maximising calculations or a set of learned or internalised values. Identities thus precede interest. In addition, stories as Roe maintains are force in themselves (1994), in that it is by telling stories that the agents locate themselves within the larger context and web of relations, the way we experience and make sense of what is happening to us. With our actions, we produce new narratives, hence identities that would in turn generate new action(s), therefore the use of the term interactive, dialectical relationship.

However, we are influenced in our actions also by the structural context we are embedded in and by the stories through which we create our identities. To paraphrase a famous dictum: ‘We first make our stories, and then our stories make us’. By linking the concepts of narratives and identities to that of the enlargement project, I hope to bring a new perspective to the seemingly intractable problem the enlargement presents to the existing IR theories.

Building on the theoretical framework and analysis there are two possible venues in answering the sub-questions posed at the beginning, namely:

First, a tentative answer to the question: How identity and boundaries are related, would be that: ‘contested borders imply contested identity’ (Bechev, 2004). Moreover, by applying Maria Todorova’s framework of ‘Balkanism’ to the question of ‘where Europe begins and where it ends’, it could be asserted that: ‘Europe ends where politicians want it to end’. (2009)

The challenge of this research would be to deconstruct the identity narratives and to reveal how the meaning of what is called ‘European’ is produced in order to seek ways in which the Balkans can be re-imagined. The borders, as Klaus Eder (2006) maintains can be hard and soft facts, meaning political struggle over objective/subjective borders of defining who the Europeans are, who ‘count as’ and who not, where to draw the lines of inclusion and exclusion. The role of the ‘Other’ in the East-West axis of Europe’s division in the construction of the fuzzy Eastern frontier would serve to identify the social space ‘Europe’. Until the 1989 when the Soviet Communists have sealed the borders, the question of the eastern frontier seemed to have been solved.

However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany, the eastern question took a central stage and the term ‘Europe’ has never ceased shifting around the map ever since. The course of the history could have taken a dramatically different path, had it not been for the fall of the wall. The integration process would simply not be on the agenda as there would be no integration needed.
If we think in terms of Yanow (2000), we can come to see that there is a symbolic meaning in the demolition of this artificial divide, in the sumptuous celebrations of the 20th jubilee of the united Germany, the artifacts in the mass media, Berlin without a wall to symbolise the partition of Europe, which 2009 saw. Following this so called ‘geopolitical earthquake’, the East has come to be understood not as a fixed territorial location, but as a subjectively constructed property of the mind, an intellectual and political project that means different things to different people in different circumstances. Due to this dual framing of Europe and not yet Europe, the East has emerged as a place of neither the old nor the new, the no-longer and the not-yet.

Second, the CEEC governments, on the one hand, framed the issue of the enlargement of the EU to include the post communist countries as a pan-European collective interest of peace, stability and welfare on the continent, avoiding the costs of ‘half Europe’ (Saryusz-Wolski, 1994). The European Commission, on the other hand, in its attempt to cut through the uncertainty framed its role as a ‘force for good’ and pledge for an objective, apolitical negotiations, meaning that standards for accession will be levied on the to be members. In fact, this is what the Copenhagen framework is all about, to screen the candidates to identify which applicant country would ‘count as’ eligible candidate, whether to include or exclude according to the definition (democracy, human rights and the rule of law).

In such regard, this regulatory function of the EU and the concept of normalization it implies could be seen in terms of the theory of Foucault’s genealogy (1990). Originally developed to link welfare eligibility to appropriate/acceptable (hetero)sexuality, in similar vein this concept could be employed to link eligibility for membership to the ‘right’ values and norms. In seeking to compensate for their inferior material bargaining power the CEE countries referred to the enlargement as an issue of collective European identity, which lay less in the force of the law than in constructing a moral obligation and the concept of European social responsibility. By appealing to the very raison d’être of the community the applicant states crafted in such a way their ‘belonging to Europe’ as to compel those who openly oppose their entitlement to membership to consent or lose face among their peers.

On the whole, due to the high uncertainty Europe became rhetorically entrapped to assent to the ‘rightful Return to Europe’ of the former communist satellite states, trapped argumentatively in the narratives constructed by the accession seeking countries or admit the hypocrisy of its formal pan-European discourse, which can affect negatively the credibility and the legitimacy of the community.

1.3. WHICH

1.3.1. RESEARCH METHODS

The approach employed in this research will be based on qualitative research methods. Given the fact that I am interested in the process of collective decision making of Europe to enlarge eastward, which presuppose the existence of stories of different political actors, it seems reasonable to employ the approach of narrative policy analysis.

I set out from the outset, to analyze the eastern enlargement of two countries, Bulgaria and Romania. On the one hand, studying the enlargement to these
countries is most meaningful in view of the comparative aspect in the research design with ‘2004 accession class’. On the other hand, this choice is motivated by considerations of real-world relevance to the coming enlargement negotiations with the former Yugoslav ministates and possibly Turkey.

It is the intention of this research to try to reconstruct the conflicting narratives of enlargement contrary to non-enlargement, which would be the story and the non-story respectively, by employing the general precept of the semiotics ‘a thing is defined by what it is not’ (Roe, 1994; Van Eeten, 1999).

The research objective is to come up with a metanarrative and to uncover the hidden ideological and power structures behind the EU’s decision to expand.

Building on Roe’s theoretical and research method steps, the sequence in which the analysis will proceed is outlined in the figure here to follow:

![Figure 2: Roe’s (1994) four step model for policy analysis. Source: Adapted from Bridgman & Barry, 2002.](image)

Given that the core characteristic of the enlargement debate is uncertainty, there is a substantial role for applying narrative epistemologies. As it can be noticed from the figure above, if in asking the question – ‘Is the problem highly contentious with no agreement on the values at stake?’ – the answer is yes, as is the case with the eastward enlargement, then adopting the Roe’s framework for policy reconciliation can assist recasting the issue.

Only after having reached a shared definition of the problem, would applying the conventional tools for policy analysis make sense. Otherwise, we risk reaching a deadlock in the negotiations or, as van Eeten has it ‘dialogues of the deaf’, where ‘talking to each other gives way to talking past each other’ (1999).

The puzzle of the eastward enlargement cannot be framed simply as one of efficiency, as many would be tempted to, since there is a lack of agreement on what exactly represents the problem in the very first place. To make things even worse, it is highly likely that the stakeholders involved in the controversy would use the same arguments to support their polarised opinions, since ‘disagreements about facts actually mask a conflict between underlying ‘belief systems’” (Van Eeten, 1999).
1.4. WHY

Academically, this thesis is informed by the work of Roe in the field of policy analysis and empirically by the study of the 5th Eastward enlargement, which saw the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania. From the theoretical vantage point, the paper herewith presented would be of worth due to the recent interest triggered by the ‘widening’ of the EU to the East.

Moreover, it is alleged that despite the immense wave of academic publications, the enlargement process is taking place in a ‘theoretical vacuum’ (Schmitter, 1996). In that regard, this analysis would be of benefit to the theoretical stock of knowledge and an innovative approach in the field of EU enlargement and collective identity.

The added value of the research would be of interest for the analysis of the current new ‘great debate’ between rationalism and constructivism, positivist social science (traditional, conventional policy analysis) and interpretative (post-modernist policy analysis).

1.5. OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH

The argumentation follows five main steps, namely:

First, the purpose of this opening chapter is to Introduce the story of the thesis, define the research question and statement of purpose, and formulate ‘What it is, How it is, and Why it is’ (Roe, 1994) to be studied.

Second, the chapter entitled Theoretical framework will echo what the research theory on European identity, Narrative Analysis and European Integration has to say in relation to the topic of the study. The way the existing literature applies to the research question posed at the beginning will be discussed. The research hypothesises will be formulated based on the theoretical assumptions and concepts.

Third, the chapter Research Design and Strategy will debate around the choice of case study (Bulgaria and Romania, enlargement of the EU). The NVivo software package for qualitative data analysis will be used in order to identify the stories that dominate the issue, and ideally to reveal the hidden power discourses in deconstructing and mapping the enlargement narrative to its beginning, middle and end. Finally, the limits and boundaries of the study will be discussed.

Fourth, in the chapter Narrative Analysis – the praxis of reframing enlargement an overview of the epistemological framework will be given and the four-step model developed by Roe (1994) applied in practice in recasting the issue of the 5th eastward enlargement. Next, the way the texts/images are read, interpreted and coded will be explained. The documentary film ‘Balkan Express – Return to Europe’ http://www.returntoeurope.eu will serve as a test case for the analysis and in constructing the model. Finally, since ‘a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing’ (Wolcott, 2009) the limits of the research will be discussed.

Fifth, the chapter titled Discussion & Reflection will round this research off by bringing the central concepts together for a review. Further questions for research will be discussed and some additional recommendations proposed that can help foster future aspirations in the field of EU enlargement and encourage those determined to probe into the still uncharted territory of the meaning of the stories in the policymaking.
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
THE MYTH OF ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE

My aim in this chapter is to position myself vis-à-vis the existing theoretical literature on EU enlargement and elaborate on how the theory of narrative analysis can allow us to address such a big issue as the Eastward enlargement, ‘without assuming away all that makes it big in the first place’ (Roe, 1994).

Make a small journey to any library or bookshop at hand and search for books on EU enlargement. Unlike former times, I suspect you will come across many. Most would bear sophisticated names with gripping titles and colourful covers. What could strike you, however, might well be the fact that in the field of EU enlargement there are no bestsellers, nor a single book to provide a grand narrative of what the European enlargement process is.

In public administration, the preference given to explanation over interpretation or critical analysis was a major stumbling block to research approaches of narrative enquiry. It is part of human nature to long for clear concepts to limit the uncertainty, complexity and polarisation and thus make the problems more fully operational. However, the fact that the seemingly ‘right’ and ‘innocent’ language of the Liberal Intergovernmentalists enables one reading of the EU enlargement and precludes another, should not be overlooked. Although it is tempting to think that the reality is readily observable, independent of our knowledge, and we have access to the world in pure form (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003), it is a naive and reductionist philosophy of the life-world.

Instead, as Foucault maintains, the truth and power cannot be separated (1990). What we call truth is our perception of truth, what we are conditioned to perceive as true, which is ultimately connected to the dominant ways of thinking about the world. It took a long time (late 1980s) until the dominant positivist stance of the conventional, technocratic and empiricist models be confronted with what is now known as the ‘argumentative turn’ in policy analysis (Fischer & Forester, 1993).

Since the roots of this research story lie in the interpretative, post-modernist strand of policy analysis, my interest, to paraphrase Yanow (1996), is to examine ‘How does the enlargement story mean?’ In order to do so, it is necessary to take language seriously, as it is central to our knowledge of reality and does more than merely describe the world by shaping our views of it (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Roe, 1994). The ‘museum view of reference’, which holds that ‘our images of the world are imprints of a passive mind and words are nothing more than labels for stable objects in the external world’ offers no more than naive realism (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003).

Given that the reality is so complex, we can invoke the metaphor of the elephant, used in the fable ‘The blind men and the elephant’. In the enlargement context, the political analysts are the blind people and the EU is the elephant. In recent years, there have been many attempts at ‘exploring the nature of the beast’ (Risse-Kappen, 1996). However, analogous to the six blind men, the analysts led by ‘observation’, each tell different story of what the ‘enlargement elephant’ is. Each, grabbed hold of
some part or other ‘railed on in utter ignorance’ about the rest and ‘prate about an elephant, not one of them has seen!’

Since we certainly do not get an elephant by adding up its parts, I want to provide a different kind of explanation, one beyond the traditional, rational, individualistic view of fact-value dichotomy, rather a holistic yet context specific approach, where the system as a whole determines how the parts behave. The EU does not exist on its own and is in the realm of ideational, which unlike the solar system is not something ‘out there’, and is a system constituted by ideas, told by stories, not material forces (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007). Drawing upon Said’s notion of Orient and Occident (1979), Europe is not a fact of nature, but rather an idea, an artificial community that exists only as an intersubjective awareness among people that has history, imagery, vocabulary and system of norms, constructed by certain people at a particular time and space.

Therefore, while conceptualising how to go about this chapter, I decide to begin by providing the different theoretical snapshots of the moving target (the enlargement elephant), which constitute the different pieces of the puzzle, continue gathering ‘still shots’ until having enough elements at hand to put things in ‘motion’ (Wolcott, 2009) and ‘make sense of them together’ (Hoppe, 1999).

Several studies point to the value dimension in the enlargement debate (Schimmelfennig F. , 1999; Sedelmeier, 2005). However, to argue that norms are important is just the beginning. The proposition I make is to take an eclectic approach in addressing the whole problem, rather than each of its parts. Buzzwords such as European identity (Sedelmeier, 2005), liberal community norms (Schimmelfennig F. , 1999), active and passive EU leverage (Vachudova, 2005), bargaining power (Moravcsik, 1993) and the like, provide different pieces of different puzzles.

However, the question is: ‘Can we do better than just muddle through?’ In the paragraphs to follow, I will summarise what the research theory on European identity, Narrative Analysis and European Integration has to say in relation to the topic of the study and ultimately bring the pieces together in a united effort to make sense of the enlargement puzzle.

2.1. DEBATING EUROPEAN IDENTITY

A telling example of the European identity at work can be found at any airport in the world where the physical environment accentuates its existence by having a separate queue for citizens with a European passport. By assigning a person a particular set of properties, we categorise that person as a member of a class and define a common way of understanding otherwise meaningless behaviour. The properties of a ‘European’ are in part made possible by his/her self-understanding and the shared understanding with the others who recognise that right as legitimate.

Categorisation, therefore, entails both vision and di-vision as it is an exercise in inclusion and exclusion. Such ‘marking out’ is necessarily a guilty act (Stone, 1997; Todorova, 2009), one that reflects a determination of winners and losers. This illustrates that ‘defining others and drawing border between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is of immense importance for articulating selves’ (Bechev, 2004).
Identities, like narratives, can only be understood relationally - to know what A means, one must know what is not A. Hence, the question: ‘How can an individual understand oneself if there is nothing not oneself?’ (Hopf, 1959). According to this theoretical account, the Self and the Other are mutually necessary, in that, when making sense of the others an individual needs his/her own identity, and the identity of the others to make sense of oneself.

Before going any further, I would like to make one remark that I do not claim to provide an exhaustive account on the topic of European identity here, since it is a separate research endeavour altogether. What I do is to concentrate on that part of the theory, which is related to my research question. Having said that, in reconfiguring the study of identity formation through the concept of narrative I found the ‘Social Identity Theory’ (Curley, 2009) and the concept of ‘narrative identity’ (Somers, 1994) rather advantageous.

The theory proposes that it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our identities while it is who we ARE that precondition what we DO and how we make sense of the world around us (Fig.3).

**Figure 3: ‘The way we see the problem is the problem’**

Our thinking creates our reality, which is only possible through the existence of frames, ‘no one is exempt from the need for framing’ (Rein & Schön, 1991). We need them to make sense of the world and organise the otherwise far too complex and messy reality. Those frames, however also ‘determine what counts as evidence and how evidence are interpreted’ (Rein & Schön, 1991).

The way we frame the reality is something we do unconsciously and we never really stop doing it to consider it. Such an intricate process has it become, that we come to take it for granted when later analysing our actions. Seeing the world the way we see it is a result of having chosen the frames we hold. Such a natural and automatic process has those choices become that we are rarely aware of having made them.
That only becomes problematic when we bump into someone with different but equally valid views of the selfsame issue. Therefore, the only way we can reveal the way the actors frame their reality in the enlargement debate is by examining the stories they tell in the process of deliberation with others.

‘All of us come to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our own making’ (Somers, 1994). Identities, thus, are not simply given, but discursively constructed. Todorova (2009) is no doubt right when she insists that ‘marking out is not an innocent act’, but a political one. As Stone (1997) has aptly argued: ‘At every boundary, there is a dilemma of classification: who or what belongs on each side?’

Research found that individuals tend to categorize more people as outsiders than members of their in-group, called the ‘over-exclusion effect’. That is, ‘people are more concerned with falsely labelling a person an in-group member than with falsely identifying a person as an out-group member’ (Curley, 2009). The proposition, derived from the theory, is that applicant countries have to show ‘likeness’ to the European identity in addition to meeting the membership criteria. Moreover, to the extent that individuals derive self-integrity from their collective European identity, the theory shows that people will be more inclined to evaluate otherwise threatening information in an unbiased manner if they are allowed to affirm their overall sense of self-integrity (Cohen et al., 2007).

Because people assume their own beliefs to be more valid and objective than alternative ones, the in-group members will insist on out-group members the provision of more than mere rational benefits for membership. Moreover, it is said that people resist persuasion attempts based solely on pragmatic negotiations since to do otherwise would fundamentally violate their own sense of being. Therefore, the assumption that persuasion from the in-group is more convincing than from the out-group.

### 2.2. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

‘For every complex problem there is an answer which is clear, simple and wrong.’

Despite it is widely recognised that ‘problem defining and problem solving are not separate stages in the policy process’ (Hisschemöller & Hoppe, 1996) there is little systematic enquiry about the moving of policy problems on the European policy agenda.

In political science, there is an old understanding that physical problems such as earthquakes, floods and other calamities are not truly social problems, since there is no disagreement in the value scheme. Those conditions become problems when people come to see them as amenable to human action, a failure in our culture system, and start telling stories about them.

By telling stories, we make sense of the events by assembling them in a temporal (however ephemeral) sequential plot that help us explain their relationship to other events. The transformation of difficulties into problems is said to ‘take place in something of a black box prior to agenda formation’ (Stone, 1989).
Policy problems as such do not have inherent properties, but rather political actors, in the process of policy-making, deliberately construct them in particular way, through the use of language, in order to get those issues on the policy agenda or, alternatively, to keep them off (non-decision). In the face of many unknowns, high uncertainty, and little or no agreement, a good deal of people resort to ‘problem-solving’ strategies such as ‘leave it to the experts’ (in bureaucracy), ‘leave it to the market’ (markets), ‘leave it to the people’ (democracy), and ‘let the facts do the hard work’ (natural science).

While doing the research on my topic, the eastward European enlargement, I was faced with a basic choice between two approaches or stories about the subject matter. One story, told in a manner of natural scientists seeks to find causal mechanisms and cost-benefit calculations based on the premise that actors are selfish, utility maximising individuals.

However, if we are interested in the question: ‘How can we better use the uncertainty we are unable to reduce, the complexity we are unable to simplify, the polarization for which we are unable to find a middle ground’ (Roe, 1994), we will have to engage in an interpretative recovery of actors’ beliefs embedded in the stories they tell.

Therefore, it could be said that, while the first story is an ‘outsider’, observer one, the second is an ‘insider’ told one, which seeks to understand the meaning of events in a broader social context. Given that ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ are problematic concept in the social realm, in that they articulate values as well as facts, the technical methods for problem solving appear inadequate and even can become part of the controversy itself (Van Eeten, 1999).

Doubts about the usefulness of such conventional scientific rigour together with its political neutrality generated the call for more ‘usable knowledge’ (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979 in Hisschemöll & Hoppe, 1996). As an alternative to the mainstream dogmas of fact-value dichotomy and value neutral analysis, Roe raise up to the challenge and develops a new conceptual model with one basic rule: ‘Never stray too far from the data, if you want to be useful’ (1994).

In an attempt to make sense of the diverging perspectives, Roe proposed a four-step model that ‘allows the reformulation of increasingly intractable policy problems in ways that make them more amenable to the conventional policy analytical approaches’ (1994). Instead of ‘steering clear of political hot potatoes’ (Hisschemöller & Hoppe, 1996) and ‘shying away’ from political controversies, Roe’s approach ‘thrives’ on the uncertainty, complexity, and polarization, accepts and puts them at the heart of his work, seeing them as ‘the basis for action, not paralysis’ (1994).

In the midst of limited knowledge and imperfect understanding, asking: ‘What’s the story behind the issue?’ gives new light of matters ‘dead on the water’ (Van Eeten, 1999). Writing this, made me think that from a narrative-analytical point of view, the question I am going to answer is: What is the story behind the 5th Eastward enlargement of the EU?
2.3. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

In the literature, there is a bias over presenting policy problems as issues of maximising benefits. The long time dominant rationalist approaches and in particular their main proponent in EU studies, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993) are based on such materialist assumptions. On the basis of such assumptions, the collective agreement of the incumbent member states to enlarge is difficult to explain and the accession of the CEECs appears to present a puzzle to those approaches, which are woefully under-socialised.

This begs the question whether the fifth enlargement round should be viewed purely in material terms as a product of cost-benefit calculations of utility maximising actors and deeply embedded normative processes or are the preferences not just given but formed in the pre-negotiation process in a larger socio-political context. The constructivist ‘logic of appropriateness’ appears to better capture the much more nuanced social dimension and moral responsibility that binds Western European governments to assist the transition process in their neighbour post-communist countries.

Facts in the natural as well as the social world depend upon underlying meanings and belief/appreciative systems. Meaning is said to precedes facts, in that ‘We do not discover a problem ‘out there’; we make a choice about how we want to formulate a problem’ (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979 in Hoppe, 2010). Therefore, the way the enlargement issue was framed had a potential influence on how it was resolved. Moreover, in the EU setting, the problem definition determines whether the issue is in the sphere of ‘high’ or ‘low’ politics. Further, its construction as a more bureaucratic and technical issue (‘low’ politics) or a political one (‘high’ politics) will influence which institution(s) will process it, and therefore to some extent determine its fate. Having said that, going straight to the negotiation phase, as Moravcsik did, disregards the phase where the actual problem is forged, which weighs heavily on the actual negotiation game.

The conceptual work on agenda-setting merits closer attention in that there is a gap in the literature of European integration. Adding the variable ‘agenda setting’ to our knowledge about the enlargement process would mean either development of a clear alternative to Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism or incorporating the concept in his theory. Either way, because the reality is always richer and more complex than the cognitive limitations of our mind (bounded rationality), we ‘see’ that what is most likely in a given context, without being aware of the alternative interpretations. Perception therefore, is said to be a choice of which we are not aware, as we perceive what has been chosen. In essence, the accession process may be seen as ‘perhaps the most complete operationalisation of the Lukesian (2005) third dimension of power – frame control’ (Haukkala, 2008) – the attraction of the EU’s ‘soft power’ or ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’ (Nye, 2005).

Moreover, the existence of consensus (as required in the unanimous decision to enlarge) does not indicate that power has not being exercised (Hill, 2005). The agenda manipulation strategies of preventing issues or potential issues from being made, refer to the second face of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970), where in
The rhetorical entrapment of the EU in the discourse of the 5th Eastward enlargement, the case of BG and RO

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essence, ‘those actors, who have the power to decide on the policy agenda, also have the power to choose the problems they like to solve’ (Hisschemöller & Hoppe, 1996).

As a result, the actors, not due to bargaining power but thanks to their framing capability were able to influence the ‘name of the game’ (Friis, 1998): ‘Who determines what the game is about, rules the country’. Hence, there is no such thing as ‘reference independence’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), since it is not easy to distinguish between ‘what is said of the situation’ from ‘the situation in which it is said’. Rather there is a situational interdependence, a dynamic interaction between structure and agent (Fig.4), where the one cannot be told apart from the other as ‘each brings the other into being’ (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003).

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 4** Enlargement understood as a dynamic interplay between Discourse practice, Identity and context

Therefore, in the context of the European enlargement it is not solely the liberal-democratic norms, the ‘rhetorical entrapment’ (Schimmelfennig F. , 1999), the European identity or the ‘special responsibility’ of the EU (Sedelmeier, 2005), but rather the complex interplay of all those factors together with the agenda-setting in the specific context, that influence the outcome. One way to understand the actor’s behaviour is to deconstruct the process of discursive structuration of the issues that dominated the debate over the agenda-setting/framing.

### 2.4. SEEING-THINGS-TOGETHER

Exploring the complex question of European identity, which has become the watchword of the times, and linking it through the research on narrative analysis to the enlargement project draws attention to the new ontological dimension of narrative studies away from the mainstream methods and forms of representation.

The theory proposes that ‘ontological narratives are used to define who we are, which in turn can be a prediction for knowing what to do. This ‘doing’ will in turn produce new narratives and hence, new actions’ (Somers, 1994). Identity however, is embedded in the context within which it is formed. To have some sense of the world and understand their place in it, the agents organise the different series of otherwise isolated events into stories that have beginning, middle and end.

Consequently, they act according to those stories and ‘tailor’ the reality to fit them. The actors’ different “readings” of the reality breed different frames that guide their actions, which ultimately make the world itself different. My aim is to recover those narratives, which are vehicles for making sense of the self and a way of applying
order to the chaos and overburdens of information, and deconstruct the enlargement story to its beginning, middle and end. By so doing, my larger hope is to reveal the taken-for-granted discourses that shape the power relations in the enlargement debate. Reconstructing the actors’ stories will enable us to understand the way the actors slice their context and frame their reality.

I have thought hard about how to represent the complexity of the EU enlargement graphically: ‘What is that structure, sophisticated enough to capture the complexity of relationships in the enlargement debate and simple enough to provide a clear mechanism of its functioning?’

The answer I come up with was ‘the DNA’ (Fig.5). The two long strands entwined in the shape of a ‘double helix’, to use the parlance of this example, are ‘identity’ and ‘enlargement’. The segment that links them together is the ‘discourse’, which is the backbone of the ‘DNA molecule’ and holds the ‘chain’ together. The segments that carry the ‘genetic’ information are the ‘genes’ of language, the different facts, symbols and ‘submerged’ values that we outwardly manifest through our action(s). It is the specific context, elements of which the actors select and integrate into their stories, that binds those actions and shapes the actors’ expectations. Texts therefore, exist in context.

**Figure 5: The Enlargement DNA**

Similar to the DNA molecule, which contains the genetic information of the organism, the enlargement is possible in the context of the EU’s founding myth to keep its membership open to ‘any European state’ that respects the founding values and principles of the Union. This pan-European vocation, together with the liberal
community norms, formed the basis of the Schimmelfennig’s idea that Europe has being ‘rhetorically entrapped’ to assent to the membership of the CEE countries (2003).

However, historical precedents of earlier enlargement rounds reflect that these factors alone are not sufficient to account for the EU’s decision to enlarge. Ulrich Sedelmeier, in a consequent study (2005), saw the ‘special responsibility’ component together with the EU’s collective identity vs-à-vis the CEECs as ‘the key factor in the EU’s eastern enlargement policy’. Nevertheless, it seems that both authors took the actors’ preferences as given, rather than formed in the process of negotiation with others, hence they too neglect the phase of agenda-setting and preference formation.

This research contributes to the discussion by adding another component to the enlargement discourse, the taken for granted agenda setting, the framing and possible manipulation of which can be studied through examination of the stories, myths, language and symbols used in the enlargement debate. Unlike previous studies on the enlargement process, the one herewith presented utilises narrative epistemology lenses to integrate narrative and post-modernist approaches to the research of European integration.

2.5. HYPOTHESES

Having consulted the literature, there are three hypotheses to provide an interpretative explanation of the research questions posed at the beginning.

First, given the uncertain and complex nature of the debate, the enlargement reality does not operate in a simple or linear manner. Rather there is a dialectical relationship between European identity ↔ Narratives ↔ Enlargement. Following Dunn’s principle of ‘methodological congruence’ the methods of problem structuring are ‘about’ and come ‘before’ the ‘lower-order’ methods of problem solving (Dunn, 2008). Building on Roe’s methodological steps in narrative policy analysis will help reach to the heart of the problem definition, examining the dominant stories, and recasting the issue and make it more amenable to conventional policy analytical tools. The taken for granted phase of pre-negotiation and agenda-setting is the central stage where the actors formed their preferences. Due to the high uncertainty, which surrounded the enlargement negotiations, the actors entered the debate without clear view of their preferences and difficulties in narrowing-down their interests. Therefore, I anticipate that the role of agenda-setting will be greater in the pre-negotiation phase (H1), where the actual framing of the problem is done and the actors are most uncertain about their real preferences.

Second, a common way to put a boundary around a policy problem is to measure it. This is exactly what the Copenhagen criteria are supposed to do – to measure in an ‘objective’ manner the readiness of the applicant to meet full membership. However, those criteria not only stand for a ‘rational’ basis for incorporation of new members, but also represent the EU’s core identity. In its attempt to cut through the uncertainty, the Commission attempt to push the problem out of the realm of complexity and into the realm of facts in their preeminent ‘objective’ status. Although the debate appears to be about ‘measuring’ the readiness – the so-called ‘screening process’, which
entails ‘analytical examination’ of the EU’s acquis implementation – it is about categorisation – ‘what counts as’ (Stone, 1997). The fundamental issue of any policy problem as Stone maintains is ‘how to count the problem’: ‘Where to draw the lines of inclusion/exclusion?’ (1997). The very question highlights the critical issue of establishing boundaries. However, as the case of BG and RO proves in practice what Stone has theoretically argued ‘the thresholds are always subject to challenge’. The fuzzy Eastern frontier came to symbolise the so-called ‘reactive effect’ – ‘people, unlike rocks, respond to being measured’ (1997). Therefore, we can expect that this will lead people to ‘conceal, fudge, and bend the rules at the borderline’ (Stone, 1997). Having said that, we come to the concept of ‘nesting orientalism’, which has aptly been used by Todorova when she said that: ‘East is a relational category, depending on the point of observation: East Germans are ‘eastern’ for West Germans, Poles are ‘eastern’ to the East Germans, Russians are ‘eastern’ to the Poles’ (2009). Therefore, on the one hand, we can expect from the applicants the tendency to renounce what they perceive as East in themselves and shift the discursive border further east their country’s borderline. On the other hand, we can hypothesise that the stronger the in-group members identify with the group, the stricter the criteria for allowing an out-group member to join (H2) (Curley, 2009).

Third, the actor’s framing of the enlargement is potentially influential since the enlargement issue does not have inherent properties. Rather, the actors in their deliberative use of language and symbols attribute it particular properties. The very term ‘enlargement’ already framed the issue as a one-way process implying a particular ‘rational’ choice. Considering that ‘people’s choices are partly determined by other people’s expectations’, it does not come as a surprise that ‘people will try to give the impression of themselves as doing what they think other people want’ (Stone, 1997). Merely placing the option to enlarge invites people to consider choosing it. In a sense, this reflects the ‘Normative power EU’ that is first and foremost a ‘discourse in which EU actors themselves construct themselves as ‘model citizens’” (Diez, 2005). The narrative roles of Europe as ‘force for good’ and the Bulgaria and Romania’s ‘current self versus former self’, was a way to declare ‘likeness’ to the group by the latter and let the former confirm their self-integrity and open-up to the enlargement possibility. In addition, it is to be expected that persuasion from the in-group will weigh more and be more convincing than persuasion from the out-group (H2a). In that regard, a number of studies have confirmed that exposure to news frames has considerable impact on the general understanding and public support for the EU enlargement (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2010). Therefore, we can hypothesise that when an issue is salient in the media the likelihood is that it will be high on the agenda as well (H3).

In this chapter, I have addressed three questions, the key question of: What are the mechanisms underlying the dialectical relationship between European identity ↔ Narratives ↔ Eastward Enlargement, and the two sub-questions: How identity and boundaries (lines of inclusion/exclusion) are related and How did the actors’ framing of the enlargement process affect the ‘negotiation game’? I surmised that there is a deficit in the literature on EU enlargement on the point of agenda-setting and provided three hypotheses to the above research questions.
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN AND STRATEGY

TELL ME YOUR STORY, TO TELL YOU, WHO YOU ARE

Who
Says What
In Which Channel
To Whom
With What Effect?
/ Harold Lasswell /

The purpose of the preceding chapter was to integrate the theories of European identity, Narrative Analysis and European Integration and provide a theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis in the chapters to follow.

The purpose of the current, methodological part is to provide an insight into the choice of case study and argument the selection of narrative analytical approaches in analysing the discourse of the 5th Eastward enlargement. Furthermore, this chapter aims at providing a description of how I went about developing my research model using NVivo software to empirically test the theoretical expectations outlined in the previous chapter.

‘What would a policy analysis look like if it started with stories rather than ended with them?’ This question turned out to be a potent way to treat complex issues of high uncertainty in the case of the narrative policy analysis conducted by Roe (1994). Why not see where it will take us in the case of the eastward enlargement. Once I started developing that idea, I began to see the story behind the fifth EU enlargement, not only the dates when it reaches its zenith, like 1st of May 2004 or January 2007. Rather than beginning or ending on those very days, the enlargement is a long and arduous process characterised by a substantial degree of uncertainty that lends itself to novel ways of conceptualisation, such as narrative analysis. I have chosen to approach the case of Bulgaria and Romania, ‘the new kids on the block’, although knowing that this will open the floodgates of even more uncertainty and complexity.

However, this made it even more complicated a case than previous enlargement rounds for the standard policy analytic methodology and a stronger case for narrative analytical problem solving that even need uncertainty, complexity and polarisation as means to finding a solution. Heretofore, the enlargement has been widely perceived as isolated episodes, ‘waves’, which tell us little or nothing about the EU construction as such. This came to be a reason enough to arise much interest and warrant opening the ‘black box’ of the collective decision-making and agenda setting in order to understand how the pro-enlargement politics come about in the specific integration context.

Therefore, the role of narrative as a way of applying order to that unimaginable overabundance of information helps to see the things together as one-thing-after-another in the enlargement story. To help disentangle the complex web of interactions by which European identity was discursively constructed through narratives and linked to the enlargement project I found the qualitative data analysis software package – NVivo, rather beneficial.
In analysing and organising the rich, complex and unstructured data, I have drawn heavily on wide variety of historical documents, such as strategic Council decisions, speeches, interviews, newspaper articles along with nonverbal artifacts such as cartoons from newspapers published on key dates and the spatial architecture of built-in space. Following the argument advanced by Ulrich Beck that ‘architecture is politics with bricks and mortar’ (Beck, 1998 in Delanty, 1995), I have selected the building of the Reichstag, the ‘Millennium Dome’ in London, the buildings of the European Commission and European Parliament as communicating important discourses in forming the European identity: ‘the building should not keep any secrets’ (Foster, 2001). These I 1) coded, together with episodes from the two series about Bulgaria and Romania’s ‘Return to Europe’ from the documentary movie ‘Balkan Express-Talking Balkans’ and the real-life stories of the people from the BBC’s rubric ‘On this day - 9 November 1989: The night the Wall came down’.

For example, I coded (categorised) all the content related to the concept of ‘Moral duty and special responsibility’ in one node, afterwards I group the interrelated nodes in three sets, namely ‘narrative’, ‘enlargement’, and ‘identity’, and then 2) connected them with the other project items in ‘Relationship nodes’, the classification model of which can be seen in the graphic below:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 6: Dialectical Relationship mechanism – Classification model**

To ‘put some flesh’ on the scheme outlined above, the actors used narratives, which embed identities, as vehicle for constructing their current self as part of Europe, promoting enlargement, by showing ‘likeness’ to the European identity, and contrast it with the former self – the Soviet Union, the Ottoman Empire, Tsars and Sultans.

I have illustrated this string of arguments with the case of Bulgaria and Romania, which is furthermore noteworthy for the historical role it continues to play in debates over the accession of the former Yugoslavian ministates: ‘In 1999, two thirds of Romanians still believed that communism had been a good, but badly implemented, idea. *Today, Romanian society looks very different.*’ (ERSTE, 2008, my emphasis) Kostov, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, declared that one of the goals of his government was EU membership within 10 years. ‘From the strategic point of view, we had to propose some serious goal, an alternative which is positive for the nation. And on the other hand, *European membership was a symbol of our real orientation.*
Bulgaria would become, instead of a satellite of the Soviet Union, a European country. So, in this way, the European Union was a very important message, because it was: *we would not be like we used to be, we will be very different.*

On the other hand, the narrative role of the European Union as a ‘force for good’ has been constructed and founded on the European identity and is in addition a telling clue to the existence of dialectical relationship between identity ↔ narrative ↔ enlargement: ‘This enlargement enables us to extend the domain of stability, peace and prosperity to Romania and Bulgaria. It enables us to spread the values of Europe, which is based on democracy, pluralism and the rule of law.’ (European Parliament, 12 April 2005) ‘The European Community is the anchor of stability for all of Europe at this time, the source of hope and optimism for the future.’ (Council, 28 April 1990) It is through the *enlargement* and the *narratives* the different actors tell, which are products of their *identity*, that this identity is reinforced and come back full circle again in reinforcing the enlargement discourse.

Having examined the many policy narratives that populate the enlargement debate, I have distilled sixteen interdependent nodes, which are collections of references about a specific discourse. In order to organise and visualise the mesh of interconnected discourses in the enlargement debate, and facilitate the understanding of the phenomena, I construct the following map (Fig. 7) to give the big picture of the enlargement puzzle.

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**Figure 7:** The mutually interdependent relationship between narrative, identity and enlargement

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If there are two things to take with you from the graphic above let them be – text and reading. What do both have to do with the enlargement? The answer according to Roe would be: ‘Text and reading are core to contemporary literary theory’s focus on the narrative, and this theory and focus prove immensely helpful in addressing the major policy issues of our day.’ (1994) How texts are read influence how they are interpreted, to illustrate that point consider the way the CEE governments interpreted the ‘overcoming the divisions of Europe’ (Fig.7) rhetoric as a promise of membership.

The empirical analysis in this chapter, which is the first step toward understanding the coming one, will therefore seek to reach below the surface of the enlargement discourse in revealing the hidden power relations flowing from taken for granted discourses. The paragraphs to follow will be organised along deconstructing the enlargement story to its **beginning, middle and end**, where the end of the accession process will not be seen as the ‘happy ending’, but as a point of departure, the beginning of the ‘real hard work’ of membership. To visualise the sequence of events I have drawn the ‘enlargement storyline’ with the key historical milestones in its development on the graphic below:

![Enlargement Storyline Diagram](image)

Researchers have been puzzled by the difficulty of identifying the exact moment when the decision to enlarge eastwards was taken. There has been plethora of changes in the wake of the heady days of 1989 that pushed for a pro-enlargement decision. However, as Olli Rehn, the Commissioner responsible for enlargement has
A growing membership has been part of the development of European integration right from the start. *The debate about enlargement is as old as the EU itself.* (European Commission, 2007)

Reading this statement prompts me to dig deeper into the European integration history back in the time when the founding fathers forge the vision of the future European Union: 'Our community is neither a small Europe, nor a restricted Community. *Its limits are not fixed.* They are fixed by those countries which, for the moment, do not join it. It depends only on them that our limits will be cast wider' (Jean Monnet, quoted in Sedelmeier, 2005).

Formally, it is widely acknowledged that the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993 set the stage for enlargement, laying down the conditions for accession. However, the absence of any debate on enlargement at the Council meeting indicates that the decision has already been agreed upon, changing the game from one of *‘whether or not to enlarge’* to *‘how and when to enlarge’*. Therefore, my reading of the enlargement story considers that the seeds of the enlargement have been with the EU from the moment of its inception. They have been discursively sown and become more deeply ingrained in the self-understanding of the people, especially the high EU officials who have internalised them in the long processes of habitualisation and socialisation, as the EU matures.

Nevertheless, the exact semantic meaning of how the actors ‘slice their context’ is not out there, visible to all. ‘Rather it is composed of the total of the underlying narratives and behavioural dispositions that make up that individual’s life world’ (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003) to which I will now turn.

My reading of the enlargement story goes something like this:

### 3.1. TRACING THE ENLARGEMENT STORYLINE

#### 3.1.1. THE BEGINNING OF THE BEGINNING – FROM EUROPE AGREEMENTS TO COPENHAGEN

‘Who start talking enlargement, with whom, under what conditions, to what effect and purpose?’

The first step to bring about action is by having a reason to act. It would be fair to say that the demise of the Soviet Union and its shrinking forces to subjugate and control its Central and East European (CEE) satellites was such a reason in the case of the Eastward enlargement. It was the decision that something needs to be done that led to the formulation of preferences rather than vice versa. ‘In the run-up to the Copenhagen European Council, the decision in the Council focused mainly on trade concession and the institutional framework and did no longer seriously challenge the principle of membership. (Sedelmeier, 2000)’

This pattern is the reversal of the usual logic of pre-fixed preferences assumed in the rationalist models of decision-making. In fact, the majority of the scholars have been busy comprehending the actual integration process, paying little attention to the pre-negotiation phase and agenda setting. The member states *de facto* agreed to enlargement well before the terms of accession were fixed, therefore, the agenda-setting was the crucial ‘veto-point’, the phase where the actual problem was framed.
and the preferences formed. In other words, ‘no policy can be made if the issue to which it is addressed cannot first be placed onto the active agenda (Peters, 2001)’.

In the report for the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992, the Commission proposed that the European Council ‘should now confirm that it accepts the goal of eventual membership in the European Union for the CEECs when they are able to satisfy the conditions required’.

Although it had not yet been formally announced, the enlargement decision has already been taken for granted, as the German Council President, Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher stated: ‘If this is true, then history has already decided about the ‘if’ of eastern enlargement, even though the ‘how’ and ‘when’ remain to be designed and decided.’ (Die Zeit, 21 January 1999, p. 3, quoted in Fierke & Wiener, 1999) Saying something is doing something. It was Robert Schuman who saw this quite clearly back in 1963 when he stated that: ‘We must build the united Europe not only in the interest of the free nations, but also in order to be able to admit the peoples of Eastern Europe into this community if, freed from the constraints under which they live, they want to join and seek our moral support. We owe them the example of a unified, fraternal Europe. Every step we take along this road will mean a new opportunity for them. They need our help with the transformation they have to achieve. It is our duty to be prepared.’ While earlier discourses had merely implied that enlargement was appropriate, it was the Copenhagen meeting that turned the discourse into a ‘firmly articulated commitment to the CEEC’s eventual accession.’ (Sedelmeier, 2005)

This commitment changed the perspective of policy and set the incremental path to enlargement that became increasingly difficult to reverse. Indeed, as Sedelmeier maintains: ‘most EU documents (and academic writing) at later stages of the enlargement policy identify Copenhagen as the starting point of the enlargement process’ (2005). In fact, the body of ‘hard’ evidence concerning the enlargement decision is very limited. From Europe Agreements (EAs) signed first with the Visegrad three in 1991, which formed the blueprint for accession, to the formal membership offer made at Copenhagen: ‘associated countries that wish to become full members of the Union will be admitted as soon as they satisfy the requisite political and economic conditions’ (Council, 1993).

Similar to saying ‘I do’ in the context of marriage, the promise to membership entails a range of moral and legal consequences. Therefore, the Eastern enlargement, as Torreblanca articulates it ‘looks like a typical non-decision: something, which just happened because nobody opposed it and about which we can find very little evidence. (2002)’ The explicit political message to membership promise matter not because it cost something not to comply with it, but because it became an objective in its own rights, as stated in the preamble Treaty of European Union ‘towards an ever closer Union’, the enlargement was an end in itself. The act of changing its official denomination in 1991 from ‘European Economic Community’ to ‘European Union’ symbolise this commitment to unity. By establishing itself as a ‘Union’ and the ‘text’ of the Copenhagen criteria through which the member states turn tacit knowledge of who they are and what they value into explicit criteria for membership, the EU paved the way to enlargement. As such, the Copenhagen criteria represent not just a ‘rational’ measurement for incorporation of non-members but also a cogent
representation of the EU’s own self-identity, a way the member states tell themselves who they are.

In general, in this first stage of the enlargement story the EU policy towards the CEE countries was neither to endorse nor to publicly reject the membership aspirations of the candidate countries and govern through the prospect of membership as the light at the end of the long transformation-tunnel.

3.1.2. THE MIDDLE OF THE BEGINNING – FROM LUXEMBOURG TO HELSINKI

Luxembourg is closer to Brussels than Helsinki both literally and symbolically. Despite having launched, on paper, a ‘comprehensive, inclusive and ongoing enlargement process’ with all twelve CEE and Mediterranean applicant states, in practice, only the ‘Luxembourg six’ were invited to open accession negotiations in March 1998.

This so-called ‘regatta approach’ was the result of a deliberative process started in Madrid 1995, when the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl attempted to seize the agenda by suggesting that EU should already select a particular group of countries, namely Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as future negotiation partners. However, this agenda-setting attempt was considered as too obviously self-serving, highly controversial and was later rejected when the European Council decided to postpone the decision and the entire ‘selection problematique’ until after the Commission prepare the assessment of the applicants’ readability.

In July 1997, following the publication of the longest document in EU history, which came under the heading of ‘Agenda 2000’, the Commission recommended that the EU should open negotiations with only five CEE countries. Not surprisingly, it was in the interest of the Commission to try and reduce the overload, faced with so many question marks in a situation of high uncertainty and parallel games, like the launching of the economic and monetary union (EMU), the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy CAP and the negotiation of a deal with Turkey and Cyprus.

As the Commission later maintains, in its attempt to cut through the uncertainty its framing of the ‘number question’ – how many applicants should be invited, gave the ‘false’ impression of creating two separate groups of applicant countries. This ‘vulnerable’ aspect of the Commission’s ‘objectivity’ frame was used by Sweden, Denmark and Italy to launch a competing frame, which mission, based on the inherent pan-European vocation, was to stabilise the continent. Hence, in line with the future vision of Europe (peace and stability), they propose that ‘the EU should open accession negotiations with all associated countries at the same time to avoid creating a new division of Europe. (Schimmelfennig F. , 2001)’

Immediately after the publication of Agenda 2000, Denmark described the selection of candidates as ‘a product of no less that an arbitrary decision’ (Agence Europe 7021 23 July 1997, quoted in Torreblanca, 2002) and warned ‘not to create new frontiers’. Lamberto Dini, the Italian Foreign Minister, follow suit in criticizing the Commission, saying that ‘since none of the countries wholly met the Copenhagen criteria, the Union should therefore avoid any differentiated treatment’. Minister Lund (Sweden), in addition, urged that the EU should not ‘let the chance of establishing pan-European cooperation go by.’ (Europe 7021, quoted in Schimmelfennig F., 2001)
The pressure on the Commission mounted as time went on and the Luxembourg IGC drew closer. It has tried to defend its position with the argument that ‘differentiation does not mean discrimination’. The German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, attempted to back that argument up by saying ‘yes’ to differentiation but ‘no’ to discrimination (AE 7057 13 September 1997, quoted in Torreblanca, 2002). Before the Commission has launched its ‘objectivity’ frame, those who support small enlargement were labelled enlargement ‘sceptics’ or defenders of self-interests.

After the publication of Agenda 2000, however, the support for small enlargement was legitimised as being a result of impartial, apolitical and objective screening exercise. It is not surprising, therefore, that Agenda 2000 moved the enlargement game, since it limited the possibilities and was used by a number of member states to develop their preferences – like the UK and Germany that despite its support to a smaller enlargement quickly came to support the Commission’s ‘objectivity’ frame. Agenda 2000 also had an impact on the applicant countries.

On the one hand, those who were ‘shortlisted’ for membership would be quite sensitive to any kind of reductions of their list were the European Council to remove a candidate that was selected on the basis of an ‘objective review-procedure’. On the other hand, the ‘camp’ of those applicants who were left outside the ‘5+1’ model, not surprisingly, sided with the ‘security frame’ arguing that the proposed by the Commission ‘objectivity frame’ could develop into a ‘New Yalta’ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 19.9.1997, quoted in Friis, 1998). In addition, Latvia and Bulgaria argued in favour of having a ‘common starting line as a basis’ this, they asserted, would confirm that ‘all countries have an identical chance of becoming members’. ‘Differentiation’, they proposed, should determine the closing of negotiations, not the opening date (Agence Europe 7023 25 July 1997, quoted in Torreblanca, 2002).

Following that sensitive discourse in the run-up to the Luxembourg Council all the ministers were ‘fretfully anxious’ not to offend the uninvited, once again Jacques Santer, the Commission’s President, proclaimed that ‘differentiation is not discrimination’. (The Economist 30.10.1997) Quite strikingly, in the night of the forthcoming Council decision, the considerable competition between the ‘objectivity’ vs ‘stability’ frame had managed to ‘rock the boat’ under the Commission’s position as many countries have weakened their support since ‘it was no longer just about a ‘natural, objective differentiation’, but also about preventing new dividing lines.’ (Friis, 1998)

Now, the task was to ‘search for some intermediate ways between the proposal of the Commission and the proposal to start negotiation with all the candidates’ (Reuters 27.10.1997).

The considerable time-pressure for finding a ‘middle ground’ between the ‘5+1 model’ and the ‘regatta option’ made it possible for two rather small countries like Sweden and Denmark to move the enlargement game and lead it to result in the adoption of the principle of ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘relative merit’ by the Luxembourg Council. This policy culminated when in Luxembourg the Council pointed out that ‘all these States are destined to join the European Union on the basis of the same criteria and that they are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. The process will be evolutive and inclusive.’ (Council, 1997)
3.1.3. THE END OF THE BEGINNING – FROM 'PRE-INS' TO OFFICIAL MEMBERS

As with many historical events, it might appear now that the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU in 2007 was a ‘procedural’ conclusion of the 2004 enlargement round and therefore inevitable. However, we should not forget that ‘not too long ago, it was far from taken for granted that the enlargement would happen at all, let alone that it will happen when it did.’ (Sedelmeier, 2005) The decision to open membership negotiations was not simply the result of a ‘history-making’ decision at Copenhagen, Luxembourg or Helsinki.

Rather, it was the result of an incremental evolution process, which proved increasingly hard to reverse with each consecutive step. The crucial step that sparked this cumulative process of expansion was reached in a deliberative way, beginning with the formal endorsement of the CEECs’ membership perspective at the Copenhagen Council in June 1993. At Helsinki in December 1999, the Council decided to open accession negotiations with the remaining candidates: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Romania (the ‘Helsinki six’). The European Council ‘reeffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process’ (Council, 1999), it marked a crucial stage in the negotiation process because opening the negotiations implies willingness to conclude them.

Although the immediate aftermath of the Luxembourg compromise was largely symbolic, since after all, only the ‘Luxembourg six’ entered into concrete accession negotiations in March 1998. In an interview, the Bulgarian Prime Minister stated ‘I think that we were just formally put on the agenda of the accession process. We knew it was like that, but that was an advance, it was an advance gesture.2' The official status of ‘pre-ins’ in the accession process probably created some institutional momentum, which paved the way to 25 April 2005 when Bulgaria and Romania officially signed their Accession Treaties.

The outcome of the process can be understood as reached in a deliberative way during the discursive strategy promoted by the Commission: ‘the time has come to inject new momentum into the enlargement process and give a strong signal of its determination to bring this process forward as quickly as possible.’ (rp 00/62, 14 June 2000) It was the President of the European Commission, who amplified this approach when in his proposal to the Parliament in October 1999 he said: ‘The Copenhagen criteria are so fundamental that the European Council meeting in Luxembourg and Cologne recommended opening further accession negotiations only with countries which meet them. If we apply this recommendation to the letter, it rules out opening negotiations with most of the remaining applicant countries since they do not fully meet the economic criteria. The risk in taking this ‘hard line’ approach is that the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacrifices, will become disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their economic policies will begin to

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diverge, and *an historic opportunity will have been lost – perhaps forever*. In the changed political landscape of Europe, especially *in the Balkan region, some countries may also let slip the progress they have made towards democracy and human rights, and the European Union will have seriously failed the people of those countries.* (rp 00/62, 14 June 2000)

Accordingly, the Commission recommended to the European Council that the negotiations should start with the remaining ‘second wave’ candidates in 2000. The Helsinki European Council ‘confirms the importance of the enlargement process launched in Luxembourg in December 1997 for the stability and prosperity of the entire European continent.’ The Council articulated that: ‘An efficient and credible enlargement process *must* be sustained. (Council 1999)’ Thus, having adopted the key recommendations of the Commission’s accession strategy the negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania were opened in February 2000. In such a way, the policy advocates achieved influence by affecting the structure of the discourse. They reinforced a discourse of collective, ‘special’ responsibility *vis-à-vis* the CEE countries, which implied certain legitimate limitations.

Thereafter, the enlargement gradually made its way to the top of the EU’s political agenda, as the debates in the Parliament on the day preceding the assent to Bulgaria and Romania’s membership manifested: ‘*It is also a political agreement of some sort* with the accession candidates. It *sends a message* to them that in the next 18 months, they will be *high on our list of priorities*, and that it is their own commitment that will eventually be decisive. (Parliament, 12 April 2005)’ This is an illustration of the ‘rhetorical action’ – the strategic use of norm-based arguments, to borrow the term from Schimmelfennig, that in the institutional environment of the EU resulted in the ‘rhetorical entrapment’ of those who oppose the enlargement as they felt obliged to behave in a certain way to preserve their credibility as community members (Schimmelfennig F., 2001).

This argument most clearly resonate in the words of the Greek politician Georgios Karatzaferis in the address he gave to the Parliament the day before it gave ‘green light’ to the Bulgaria and Romania’s accession into the EU: ‘Mr President, is the question which arises whenever new countries join merely numerical and financial? In other words, is it only a question of cost, deficit, growth and production or is it also a cultural question? Is it perhaps also a social question? Romania and Bulgaria clearly do not have the European rate of growth or social justice. They lost forty-five years, which we signed away when we sent them to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt and Churchill both put their signatures alongside that of Stalin. We therefore owe them forty-five years' backlog in social development and economic growth. We must now therefore give them back what we owe them without grumbling; we must stretch out our hand and pull them into European society. We owe it to the civilisation, to the culture of Europe. *Let us not only look at the dry figures.* Dry figures are for technocrats. Numbers do not build republics, they build banking institutions, but we here are building the European republic, the European idea. Let us therefore vote in favour, because *it is necessary for the breadth of Europe, it is necessary for these new ideas with which we need to endow Europe.* (Parliament, 12 April 2005)’

To round this story off, let me use the words of the British businessman and politician Peter Beazley: ‘Therefore, I will be voting in favour. *It is most important to give the*
right message not only to the Romanian authorities but also to the Romanian population. This is not the end of the story, of course; after accession we need to continue to work. (Parliament, 12 April 2005)

The debate is closed.

The vote will take place tomorrow at 12 noon.

The key idea of this chapter was to deconstruct the enlargement narrative to its beginning, middle and end. This was done through the use of the NVivo software package by which a research model was developed in order to map and reveal the hidden power discourses in the enlargement discourse.

3.2. LIMITS AND BOUNDARIES OF THE STUDY

‘Kant argued that we can obtain knowledge about the world, but it will always be subjective knowledge in the sense that it is filtered through human consciousness.’ (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007) I do not fool myself into believing that I can escape my subjectivity just like that as if the presence of the personal pronoun ‘I’ in this research does not exist. Rather, what I endeavour to do is to discuss that subjectivity openly. If the only thing that this research yields is to trigger debate about how limited this 50 something pages must be on a topic as wide and complex as the EU enlargement, it has fulfilled its purpose. This would have meant that it has been provocative. Moreover, had that provocation resulted in action to bring to light new insight into, knowledge and understanding of the enlargement discourse, it would have been of benefit.

‘Talk is cheap, and so is criticism’ says Roe (1994). However, if we are willing to discover our boundaries, by challenging them, we will be able to examine our limits and hence, broaden our frontiers. I tried to tell the enlargement story to the best to my ability and knowledge. By no means, it is selective rather than exhaustive. Scientists have long been aware of the so-called Heisenberg effect: ‘the notion that in the course of measuring, the scientist interacts with the object of observation and, as a result, the observed object is revealed not as it is in itself but as a function of measurement’ (Todorova, 2009). Since, ‘what we see out there is conditioned by how we see it’, the way I have interpreted, ‘read’ and presented the data is problematic, as it is part of human nature to ignore or distort the uncomfortable facts that disturb our otherwise neat and ‘perfect’ assumptions. However, ‘nothing is perfect’, as the lyrics of the song goes. No one is exempt from making errors and there is nothing better than the creative error finding. To paraphrase a famous dictum ‘an error discovered is an error half wiped’ – what is called ‘failure’, as Roe maintains is part of a broader learning curve (1994).

‘Challenging assumptions’ as van Eeten has it is easy. ‘Coming up with better ones is different story. (1999)’

Having said that, the chapter to come will attempt to reframe the issue of the 5th eastwards enlargement following Roe’s theoretical and research method steps (see Fig. 2, p.8) and point to a possible metanarrative to make the issue more amenable to conventional policy analytical tools. To that end, I intend to use the semiotic square as a way to visualise the relationship and enable comparison between the arguments in order to decouple the enlargement vs. non-enlargement controversy.
CHAPTER IV

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS – THE PRAXIS OF REFRAMING ENLARGEMENT

DECONSTRUCTING ENLARGEMENT, RECONSTRUCTING ENLARGEMENT: NARRATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS IN ACTION

‘What is truer than truth?’ The answer, according to an old Jewish tale, is the Story.

The enlargement of the EU to the east had been controversial for years since the late 1980s when after a lapse of almost half a century of communist rule the diplomatic and trade relations between Eastern and Western Europe had been restored. This period marked the beginning of almost two-decade long struggle of EU and national governments to find the ‘right’ trade-off between accommodating their own national self-interests and the CEE government’s pledge to ‘return’ to their ‘rightful place in the European family’.

In the grip of uncertainty and high contingency, no one involved in the enlargement controversy knew what was really in their best long-run interest, there was neither consensus on the values at stake nor certainty on the relevant knowledge among the stakeholders and hence, the issue could have gone either way through the enlargement vs. non-enlargement axes. This was even more so in the pre-negotiations phase where the actors were most uncertain about their preferences and where the conflicting forces of who will manage to ‘tell the better story’ mould the debate because the empirical and factual merits were genuinely in doubt.

The mix of uncertainty and controversy provide a natural starting point for narrative policy analysis. In the light of such limited range of knowledge and imperfect understanding applying narrative epistemology (see Fig. 2, p.8) has a lot to offer in examining the many policy narratives that populate the enlargement debate. To see how this is done, the narrative analysis will proceed by four steps, identifying four narratives that underwrite and stabilise the issue that will be examined below.

4.1. FINDING THE METANARRATIVE

The best place to begin our analysis, says Roe (1994) is ‘those policy narratives that populate the lives of policymakers and analysts’, which were the focus in the preceding chapter. Building on it, the enlargement controversy is dominated by two competing sets of narratives, one that closely conform to the conventional definition of a story (enlargement), and the other that was essentially its critique in the form of a non-story (non-enlargement). Neither of the two, however, was able to gain sufficient support and credibility. Therefore, in order to make the relations among them visible I will use the semiotic square. Such a move will decouple the enlargement/non-enlargement cul-de-sac by applying the idea on which the semiotic square operates, namely that to understand the real meaning of a position one needs to analyse the contrary and contradictory positions. This way, by enabling the comparison between the arguments, the semiotic square allows us to connect them in a more fruitful way and define a new agenda, the metanarrative, that is a crosswalk and mediates between the polarised positions. To put it in semiotic terms, it identifies
a ‘zone of entanglement’ between the arguments that is ‘not a common ground or a compromise but a different platform for interaction’ (Van Eeten, 1999).

Let us now turn to examine those stories in more detail and see how the semiotic square can help us ‘make sense of the diverging perspectives’ of the enlargement discourse in such a way as to come up with proposals on how they may be connected more fruitfully (Van Eeten, 1999).

**Figure 8 Semiotic square on EU enlargement policy**

As can be seen from the graphic above we are confronted with two arguments each of which is valid on its own terms and points to opposing implications for action. If we read the first opposition to be about whether or not to enlarge, then we can see how the two other alternatives of ‘Return to Europe’ and NPE (Normative Power Europe) rise out of that opposition. If we take the ‘number issue’, that is with how many applicant states to open enlargement negotiations, which dominated the debate, we can see that each of the four narratives have ‘very different policy implications, even when they appear to ask for the same measures’ (Fischer F. M., 2007).

From the enlargement narrative, the number question is translated into the ‘regatta approach’ – comprehensive and inclusive enlargement, which is essentially the ‘security’ frame advanced by Sweden, Denmark and Italy in the pre-Luxembourg enlargement game. On the other hand, for the non-enlargement narrative, the inclusive nature of the ‘regatta’ process would never be on the agenda, rather the enlargement would be perceived as limited and restricted to only a small number of countries, in essence the framing of the problem would mirror the ‘objectivity’ frame advanced by the Commission. The real question for the ‘Return to Europe’ narrative does not revolve around the number of accession countries, instead the focal point is to ‘overcome the divisions of Europe’, as stated by the Polish chief negotiator: ‘the technocratic approach is not enough in these negotiations, which have a historic goal: give Europe back to Poland, and Poland back to Europe.’ (Europe 5456, 21 March 1991) In contrast to the other narratives, the dominant storyline from the ‘Normative Power Europe’ is not about whether or not to enlarge but as declared during the debates in the Parliament prior to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU: ‘This enlargement enables us to extend the domain of stability, peace and prosperity to Romania and Bulgaria. It enables us to spread the values of Europe, which is based on democracy, pluralism and the rule of law.’ (European Parliament, 12 April 2005)
In mapping the relations between the arguments in a semiotic square, we came to see how enlargement and non-enlargement conflict, but also how they coincide. Let us now turn to examine each of the narratives that dominate the issue, since how they are read merits a closer attention.

4.1.1. THE ENLARGEMENT STORY

This story is grounded in the idea that the only remedy to the ‘tragedy of Europe’, as Sir Winston Churchill once mused, is to ‘re-create the European family’. This scenario, as illustrated in the preceding chapter, is a succession of events and like stories in general have a beginning, middle and end. The rhetoric of the enlargement story goes as far as the definition of the problem, for naming is also an exercise of framing. Once a policy terrain has been named – ‘enlargement’, the name seems natural. However, the more natural and taken for granted the frames that shape our thinking are, the less likely we are to be aware of them (Rein & Schön, 1991). So fundamental an element has the principle of a Union open to European States that aspire to full participation and who fulfil the conditions for membership has become that EU officials, academics and broad public alike have turned a blind eye to the fact that the process of naming and framing socially constructs the situation.

Therefore, one of the main problems with the enlargement is the very word itself, since it framed the reality by selecting some aspects of it, making them more salient and suggesting an appropriate course of action and framework for analysis. The name assigned to a problematic terrain, as Rein & Schön maintain ‘focuses attention on certain elements and leads to neglect of others’ (1991). A growing membership has become a political imperative for Europe and a part of the European vocation right from the start. The words of the French foreign minister Alain Juppe confirm this: ‘Our wish in France is that this new round of enlargement should take place: it is in the nature of things and in line with the undertakings we made towards these countries when we said to them: ’once you have shaken off the yoke of communism, you will be called upon to take your place among the European countries’. The main message of the enlargement narrative, that of the community’s growing integration, is signalled also by the symbolic act of name change from ‘European Economic Community’ to ‘European Union’.

The spelling out of the enlargement story is better done with some visual assistance, especially if we uphold the view that ‘a picture is worth a thousand of words’ and respect the word limits and space constrain of this thesis. Therefore, I have selected some political cartoons, encoded them and included the appropriate ones in the analysis, analogous to episodes from storyboards in filmmaking. My interest will not be on the images themselves but rather I will be concerned with the possible readings and narratives the image-texts construct in the specific publication context.

Exactly how this is done will be illustrated in the paragraph to follow.
There is a Romanian proverb: ‘Unde-s doi puterea creste’. It means where there are two or more, we are stronger. The enlargement discourse in the above cartoon is conveyed through the use of the journey master metaphor, which is commonly used in the EU accession rhetoric.

The reading of this cartoon has to take into account the date of its publication, which is indicative of the Bulgaria and Romania’s accession. It appeared in the press on the day following the European Parliament’s assent to the countries’ membership. The next thing that merits closer attention is the predominant gender in the cartoon, namely - masculine. According to Maria Todorova’s study on the Balkanist discourse ‘unlike standard Orientalist discourse, which resorts to metaphors of its object of study as female, the Balkanist discourse is singularly male’ (2009). Usually characterised as ‘wild’ or ‘semi-wild’ this masculine portrayal is fostered even in the picture (note the moustaches and the whole atmosphere – fists clenched). If we pay closer attention to the dress code of the men, we can easily distinguish that given his traditional costume (fez and shalvari – trousers) the last one to embark on the boat (half-foot in, half-foot out) is Turkish. The visual element of the men’s hats is especially idiosyncratic to their personality, which suggest that the Bulgarian and Romanian men are already on the boat. Both are sitting next to each other, with the Romanian wearing a pointed, white sheepskin hat and the Bulgarian a black one. Taking into consideration the specific facial features (moustaches, dark hair and big nose), I propose reading this personage as illustration of Bay Ganyo Balkanski, a byword for name and book that every single Bulgarian knows and has read. The immortal literary hero of the Bulgarian writer Aleko Konstantinov, the image of whom has become inextricably linked to the Bulgarian self-perception and therefore often used by cartoonists.

On closer inspection, one can notice that although the destination is clearly indicated by the sign ‘Europa’ ironically, no one on the boat is rowing neither there are oars nor
The rhetorical entrapment of the EU in the discourse of the 5th Eastward enlargement, the case of BG and RO

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water for the boat to float on. The overcrowded boat, which might as well be used as a reference to the so-called ‘regatta’ enlargement, seems to be stuck in the middle of a dry and rocky place, in contrast to the grass at the horizon around the sign ‘Europa’, which is also symbolic if we think in terms of prosperity.

The enlargement narrative is only one part of the story, however. Had that not been the case, the enlargement would indeed be only a matter of efficiency – how to enlarge to include more countries without using more resources. Nevertheless, the temptation to reduce the uncertainty and simplify the complexity would not carry the day, since to understand a position one needs to understand what it is not. Let us now turn to see how such contrast can help us transform the uncertainties into alternatives to be debated.

4.1.2. THE NON-ENLARGEMENT NONSTORY

The enlargement story had a story line, the analogue of which their opponents, the non-enlargement, did not have. This camp entirely defines itself in terms of being opposed to the other. Although it may seem like a conventional story, since it is a point-by-point rebuttal of the enlargement story and closely mirrors its structure, the non-enlargement is not an argument, but a reaction against; it could not be read while the other could. In this sense, the nonstory tells us what to be against without completing the argument as to what we should be for (Van Eeten, 1999). However, it should be noted that this does not mean that the non-enlargement argument is less logical or does not square with the facts; both are equally plausible, that is why we are offered the possibility for comparison and evaluation.

Figure 10 The Economist, 11 May 2006, ‘A case of enlargement fatigue’

The most widespread counterargument of the non-enlargement supporters is that ‘widening’ might dilute the achieved level of supranational integration and impede its further ‘deepening’ (Schimmelfennig F., 2003). There has been a shift in the public opinion and the discourse of enlargement as Europe’s ‘success story’ gave way to
the so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ (see Fig. 10), where the ‘digestion’ of the newcomers will be long and painful process. However, as Sedelmeier maintains: ‘after the Commission formally put the proposal to endorse membership perspective ‘on the table’, none of the delegations in the Council disputed it openly’ (2000).

This was puzzling from rationalist point of view and point to the underlying moral dimension in the enlargement – non-enlargement discourse. According to the memoirs of the President Mitterrand’s adviser Védrine, ‘Mitterrand considered himself in a morally awkward situation as long as he resisted the pressure of the German and the Central and Eastern European governments to consent to enlargement. Therefore, the French government felt obliged to declare its official support to the CEEC’s membership aspirations’ (quoted in Schimmelfennig F., 2001). The double bind of those who oppose the enlargement, from CEE governments on the one hand, and the drivers inside the union on the other, restricted the non-enlargement narrative from developing into a full-fledged story.

4.1.3. THE ‘RETURN TO EUROPE’ COUNTER STORY

After having listened to the two main ‘voices’ in the enlargement – non-enlargement controversy we begin to hear a third story being told, that of the ‘Return to Europe’. In contrast to the other narratives, the dominant storyline here is not about whether or not to enlarge but that in fact there is nothing to be decided. The crux of the argument is as stated by Jacques Delors that: ‘Believe me, this ritual opposition between "widening" and "deepening" is not the key issue. In reality, we have no choice.’ On the CEE side, the interpretation of the past and the end of the Cold War led them to refer to their liberation from Communism as a symbolic ‘return to an original State’. The pleaded ‘return to Europe’ was no longer seen as an ideological gesture, but as an act of restoring the nature. Therefore, those who oppose it were labelled as going against the grain, against the nature and organic order of things.

In the EU narrative about ‘return to Europe’, the fall of the Berlin Wall was considered a historic moment – the ‘End of History’ as announced by Francis Fukuyama – a moment when Europe should become, not only united, but reunited. ‘Truly, this is a moment for reinforcing European unity. Together, we all win; divided, we all lose’, said the EU Commission President Barroso in his speech ‘EU Enlargement - 5 Years After’. ‘As for those who attack enlargement for preventing any deepening of European integration, I say: check your history books. Widening and deepening have always gone hand-in-hand’, he continues. Following the real-life stories of those who had a firsthand experience of the fall of the Berlin Wall offers a different perspective of the rhetorical ‘return to the normal state’: ‘We thought it was going to change the world’; ‘I was just a nine-year-old boy with no idea in the world why a wall could be so much trouble’; ‘the psychological "wall in the head"’; ‘I remember pressing my hand against it and marvelling that it was only bricks and mortar but was symbolic of years of terror and intimidation’ (BBC, On this Day).

Rationalist would argue that the ‘return to Europe’ is purely a linguistic device, hollow rhetoric with no real persuasive force. However, while once understood as ‘just a cheap talk’, nowadays scholars recognise that talking is a form of doing and begin to see the importance of speech-act. In the enlargement context it was the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who point that out in her 1990 Aspen speech: ‘I propose
that the Community should declare unequivocally that it is ready to accept all the
countries of Eastern Europe as members if they want to join, provided that
democracy has taken root and that their economies are capable of sustaining
membership. *We cannot say in one breath that they are part of Europe and in the
next our European Community Club is so exclusive that we will not admit them.* The
same rhetoric was further reinforced by the Commission President Jacques Delors,
when he declared that Europe should live up to the role it had declared for itself: 'It is
no good making fine speeches with a sob in your voice on Sunday and then on
Monday opposing the trade concessions enabling those countries to sell their goods.'
(Financial Times, 21.08.91: 5)

Furthermore, the Danish foreign minister Ellemann-Jensen contributed to the
normative discourse, which emphasised that Europe should match words with deeds,
when he criticised that: 'Certain countries make fine statements about Europe and
democracy, but when it comes to small concessions and confronting their own vested
interests, they behave as if living on another planet'. (Financial Times, 10.09.91: 16)
As a result, the French and Spanish governments rethink their tough stance on trade
issues as they felt it was misinterpreted as general hostility to enlargement and later
take a much more accommodating policy.

The concept of ‘return to Europe’, however, does not go far enough to be seen as the
only interpretation of the relationship between Bulgaria, Romania and the EU. In the
paragraph to come, I will argue that its limitations could potentially be overcome by
bringing the concepts of enlargement and non-enlargement together in forming the
metanarrative.

4.1.4. THE ‘NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE’ METANARRATIVE

‘Normative Power Europe’ is first and foremost a discourse in which EU actors
themselves construct an image of themselves as ‘model citizens’. By placing the
universal liberal democratic norms at the centre of its relations with member and
applicant states, the EU has the power to shape the conceptions of the ‘normal’. The
so-called Copenhagen criteria can be seen as a prominent example of the political,
economic and administrative standards the EU levy to screen if the prospectus
members ‘count as’ eligible candidates. Those criteria serve to ‘spell out what the EU
is (or is supposed to be) and therefore what candidate countries should become’
(Diez, 2005).

Hence, EU is said to lead by example by setting standards for the world and
changing others, not by military force but by normative power, as Diez aptly put it:
‘Europe is called upon to embark on a “mission civilisatrice”’ (2005). Indeed, the
accession process was quintessentially the supreme exercise of power: ‘A may
exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also
exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.’
(Lukes, 2005)

The paradox of the EU’s normative power, however, is that the candidate member
states ended up wanting the wrong thing: they want membership in the Union, while
the EU want them to have the same norms and values. The EU has tried to find a
way out of the enlargement – non-enlargement conundrum by establishing ‘objective’
criterions in the form of institutionalised body of norms for ‘admission’ to the union.
The interesting question about the role of the enlargement as a vehicle for the Union’s normative power is, has the EU become a form of Panopticon, to borrow the concept coined by Foucault, in that it ‘scans’ the societies for signs of deviance with the potential threat of ‘punishment’ by exclusion. In the same line of reasoning, has the exercise of power relation become automatic in a sense that the ‘prisoners’, the applicant states, without being aware whether they are observed or not started to be their own ‘supervisor’, ‘the principle of his own subjection’ (Foucault, 1977). As Lazar Comanescu, having front-line experience of the process as a Romanian ambassador to the EU phrase it: ‘Perhaps the main effect of the prospect of EU membership has been its role as an anchor of the reform process. The drive to join the EU has been one of the most powerful incentives for undertaking major reforms in all candidate countries. (ERSTE, 2008)’

From narrative analytical point of view, what is interesting is not so much whether Europe is normative power or not, but how it is constructed as one. Such a vision of the transformative power of Europe is discursively constructed in the course of the historical formation of the Union, this is particularly evident in Margaret Thatcher’s speech in Aspen: ‘such is the scale of the problem that we shall need to devise new and more imaginative ways to help.’ She continues: ‘It should herald a fair and open Europe and one which should be immensely attractive to the newly free peoples of Eastern Europe’.

**Figure 11 The Economist, 15 November 2001, ‘The door creaks open’**

By no means the EU Commission President Barroso acknowledge the EU’s ‘soft’ power when he utters: ‘The simple fact is, enlargement has always been a potent tool for spreading peace, democracy and prosperity to all corners of our continent. As a Portuguese, I know that.’

In conclusion, the EU policy towards the CEE countries was to govern through the prospect of membership as the light at the end of the long transformation-tunnel, neither endorsing nor publicly rejecting the membership aspirations of the candidate countries (a position being criticised from both ends of the debate). Interestingly enough, should that be the case, as van Eeten maintains, then ‘you must be close to the truth. (1999)’
My purpose in this chapter was to apply in practice the four-step model of narrative analysis developed by Roe (1994) in order to recast the intractable issue of the 5th eastward enlargement to BG & RO and discover the mechanisms underlying the dialectical relationship between European identity, narratives and enlargement. The outcome of the four steps is summarised in the table below, making transparent the logic of the narrative analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Reconstruct the policy arguments of the participants to the debate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Enlargement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Non-enlargement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Compare and contrast the arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ‘enlargement’ argument is an example of conventional story that have beginning, middle and end. The ‘non-enlargement’ critique, on the other hand, is a point-by-point rebuttal, a reaction against, which entirely defines itself in terms of being opposed to the other without completing the argument as to what we should be for.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 3</th>
<th>Identify a metanarrative</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The opposition between enlargement and non-enlargement is a false one, ‘In reality, we have no choice.’ (Jacques Delors) The debate moves towards another kind of concept, that of ‘Normative Power Europe’, meaning that standards for accession will be levied on the to-be member states.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Step 4</th>
<th>Define a new agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe is called upon to embark on a ‘mission civilisatrix’. Enlargement is constructed as a potent tool for spreading peace, democracy and prosperity. EU actors define themselves as ‘model citizens’ - the concept of normalisation reinforced in the Copenhagen criteria – a framework to screen the candidates and identify which applicant country would ‘count as’ eligible candidate, whether to include or exclude according to the definition (democracy, human rights and the rule of law).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12 The four-step model of narrative policy analysis summarised**

**4.2. LIMITS AND BOUNDARIES OF THE ANALYSIS**

Two people can look at the same thing disagree and yet both be right. Bearing in mind that the meaning of the stories is not given, which implies that we had to interpret them, the role I have played in this research has not been a detached one. Thus, I do not pretend to have offered the absolute ‘truth’ written in precise style, but what I do is to provide one perspective, one possible reading of the enlargement controversy. In constructing the stories in this analysis, I have interpreted certain events and make basic assumptions about them. No doubt, this interpretation is coloured by the specific biography, tacit knowledge, the glasses through which I looked at the world, the convictions and frames that are part of me, whether I like it or not. Much as I tried to do the analysis herewith presented with an open mind, nevertheless, it was not an empty one. Hence, I do not claim that the new agenda I come up with is a ‘capital-A’ answer to the EU enlargement controversy, but rather a mere proposition to be considered.
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION & REFLECTION

Are you really sure that a floor cannot also be a ceiling?
M.C. Escher

Eventually, we have reached the end of this story, a point where everyone would expect to read the conclusion. Well, the conclusion is that there is no conclusion. I invite you to form your own opinion, since as Democritus would have it ‘Nothing exists except atoms and empty space; everything else is opinion’. However, this should not be taken to mean that I have any less confidence in the reliability of my interpretation than any other social scientist using mainstream methods. Were I to give the ‘body’ of texts, verbal and non-verbal artifacts, which I have based my analysis on, to another scholar, I assume that s/he will find no different interpretation or meaning of the enlargement discourse than I did.

This should not be taken as a disclaimer that the way I have constructed the Eastward enlargement problem was not a matter of choice I am responsible for. Nevertheless, ‘were we not selective, and thus subjective, in our focus, we would not be able to construct our accounts at all’ (Wolcott, 2009). Meaning and interpretation, therefore, should not be taken at face value since the reality has many faces, ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’ and where you stand can influence what you see. To claim now, at the end, that there is but one ‘objective’ reading of the enlargement controversy would have about as much substance as the emperor’s new clothes. Moreover, what I endeavour to do is to reveal the complexity of the issue rather than to reduce it to a simple explanation or theory.

Therefore, after having listened to the both sides of the enlargement story one begins to understand that there is more to a story than both sides. Only after having examined those stories that populate the enlargement debate can they start to take on meaning. ‘And the end of all our exploring’, as T.S. Eliot would have it, ‘will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time.’

‘Policies and political actions’ as Yanow (1996) maintains ‘are not either symbolic or substantive. They can be, and often are, both at once.’ By combining the stories that the different actors in the enlargement debate tell, we can ‘make sense of them together’ (Hoppe, 1999), begin to discern patterns and disguise the thin discourses of power beneath the surface (see Fig. 13). Given that Europe is not a fixed entity but a phenomenon of the mind, constantly constructed and reconstructed through discourse strategies and shifting terms of reference, whoever controls these names and writes the stories that constitute our reality controls our lives.
Figure 13 Map of the enlargement controversy

The graphic above is based on the reading of texts, verbal and non-verbal artifacts and is an effort to reconstruct a deeper not so apparent logic of coherence in the enlargement debate. This map could be understood as a representation of a more comprehensive web of meaning within which Europe is constructed, through political discourse strategy, as a ‘negotiated order’. Therefore, in answer to the question posed at the beginning: What are the mechanisms underlying the dialectical relationship between European identity ↔ Narratives ↔ Eastward Enlargement? I surmise that in the process of discursively constructing the European ‘order’, by framing the agenda, the public opinion through the media, and the definition of what to be European means, they bring each other into being and mutually corroborate in shaping the enlargement story. However, as Friis maintains ‘more conceptual work needs to be done on agenda setting, as the integration theory is devoid of clear hypothesis of what puts enlargement on the agenda and also how it affects the overall integration process’ (1998).

What the enlargement story shows is that, as expected (H1), the framing of the agenda indeed matter, especially in the pre-negotiation phase, which many of the member states entered with loosely defined preferences. This takes us further from Moravcsik’s theory, which departs from the notion that the preferences are pre-fixed. Therefore, future work needs to be carried out in either developing a substitute to the Moravcsik’s theory or by incorporating the concept of agenda setting in it.

Indeed if one follows the enlargement story from the beginning it is clear that an important aspect of the negotiation game was the substantial degree of uncertainty
and complexity that surrounded the enlargement debate. The principles, the rules of the game were not there at the beginning, but rather, emerged gradually (not always in a linear fashion), as a result of a deliberative incremental process and not a single decision. This ‘learning by doing’ approach to enlargement enables the EU to revisit and adapt its strategy, which was already apparent with the introduction of safeguard clauses and post-accession conditionalities in the case of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession that was a major example of policy innovation in comparison to the previous enlargement rounds.

Therefore, it is of paramount importance for candidate and potential candidate countries to learn from the lessons of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, since there is sufficient evidence to support the argument that these two countries were already exposed to a tighter and stricter scrutiny than the 2004 accession class. Following the same line of analysis, we can come to see that this allows the EU further room for manoeuvre when setting the agenda in the pre-negotiation stage where the framing of the problem is potentially influential for the outcome of the negotiations. This is already evident in the Commission’s approach to the Western Balkans and Turkey, where under the framework of the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP), additional conditionalities such as the ‘good neighbourliness’ clause and the full co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal on former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are already being imposed.

In comparative terms, with the narrative shifting from the success story of enlargement to the success story of the ENP, the European ‘carrot’, the attractiveness of the Europe’s soft power, seems to be dwindling away. This is evident in the case of the negotiations with the former Yugoslavian ministates and Turkey, where the prospect of EU membership appears to be too illusive. Moreover, in the case of Turkey, the moral responsibility component in the enlargement discourse is lacking. The main reason for enlarging to Turkey is neither that Turkey must be returned to Europe nor that the EU has a particular duty toward Turkey, but as iterated by the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, because ‘Turkey is strategically important. We need Turkey as a reliable partner in foreign and security policy. We want Turkey to be a stable democracy, respecting the rule of law and human rights. Our interest is that Turkey plays a constructive role in our common efforts to contribute to peace and stability in the region. (Verheugen, The Enlargement Process: Shaping a New Europe)’

The transition stories of Bulgaria and Romania can serve to illustrate the transformative power of the prospect of EU membership and its role as an anchor of the reform process. I note that the Accession Treaty for Bulgaria and Romania differs from the treaties of the other first wavers, part of the 5th enlargement in 2004, in two important aspects. Firstly, it is the introduction of the safeguard clauses, which would allow the postponement of their accession process by up to one year in certain circumstances. Secondly, developing the idea that ‘no two things in nature are exactly alike’, we are all different - all of the enlargement accession countries are very different. Perhaps it would be fair to say that in the 5th Eastward enlargement the only thing the CEE countries had in common was the desire to join the EU and the system they came out from, which they had to share for almost half a century of Communist rule. However, they were unevenly touched by the Soviet communism.
Compared to their fellow applicant states of the previous enlargement round (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) the nature of regime change in Bulgaria and Romania, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the overthrown of Todor Zhivkov and Nicolae Ceausescu, produced a far weaker reform impetus.

If we take a closer look at the enlargement debate, we can come to see that in conformity with the (H2) and (H2a) the majority of the applicant states showed the tendency to renounce what they perceive as East in themselves. Thus, when as spokespersons of that time Václav Havel, Milan Kundera and György Konrád launched the idea of the 'natural' return of the Central European Visegrad-group to Europe they did not only portrayed a form of 'Russophobia' but also sought to include the Balkans more explicitly in a definition of the orient. The Czech writer Milan Kundera advanced the argument that Central Europe ('kidnapped West') clearly belonged to Western Europe as it shared the same set of European values in the face of Roman Christianity, individualism, Latinness and Central European roots as bonds with Europe. The official Romanian rhetoric followed a similar line of 'choosing Europe and leaving the Balkans'. Over time, the country had actively sought to demarcate from the Balkans, pointing out its belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Habsburg factor, their Latin heritage. This discourse is reinforced by the words of the Romanian ambassador to the EU Ene, who also asserted that ‘Romania has always been part of West European traditions’.

Bulgaria, on the other hand, with its longer period of Ottoman rule and close ties with Russia, as her status of liberator, cannot be seen as having a tradition of wanting to ‘Return to Europe’. But since the Revolution of 1989 (the symbolic act of the demolition of Todor Zhivkov’s mausoleum to tear up with the past) the country declared the same ambition of membership as the other CEE applicant states.

Similar to their predecessors of Central Europe, the ‘Return to Europe' narrative figured in the programme adopted by the newly elected ‘democratic' governments of the National Salvation Front (FSN) in Romania and the resolution passed by the Grand National Assembly of Bulgaria expressing the country’s will to become a member of the European Community.

As stated by Meglena Kuneva, in her role as Chief Negotiator of the Republic of Bulgaria with the European Union in a speech on the Future of the Enlarged European Union: 'The Bulgarian society has always felt as a natural element of this community; an element that has something to contribute to the community. Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union in itself will constitute a huge contribution to peace and security in the region of South-East Europe and it will bring home the European idea and values to the countries in the region’ (Kuneva, 2001). In this passage it becomes apparent that in the discourse of the Bulgaria’s integration the geo-political stability argument, more fully mobilised in the later case of Turkey and the former Yugoslavian mini-states, begins to surface,

Although, in the period following the fall of the Wall, the ‘Return to Europe' narrative, though in different degree, took a central stage in the discourse of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession negotiation, it should be noted that it was much more widely professed by the 2004 accession class.
In response to the sub-questions of *How identity and boundaries (lines of inclusion/exclusion) are related*, let the last story to be told be mine.

First, let us set the scene: ‘One study trip to the European Institutions, two weeks before the Christmas holiday – a group of international students from various countries – ‘old Europeans’ (the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium), ‘new Europeans’ (Bulgaria and Romania), ‘not yet Europeans’ (Macedonia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro) and ‘non Europeans’ (Russia, Ukraine and Turkey). Please do not scream ‘blue murder’ to such a categorisation as it serves to illustrate an important point. Writing this made me realise how contested in reality these ‘categories’ are and how true the assertion: ‘marking out is not an innocent act’, but a political one (Stone, 1997; Todorova, 2009).

Nonetheless, let us continue with our story. Picture this: the building of the European Parliament in Brussels, the hall is quiet – everyone is holding their breath, excited to see, hear and experience the European democratic core. We were first shown the model of the Espace Léopold building, one of the multiple seats, home to the European Parliament, the glass facade and the discourse of transparency it denotes was not off course left gone unnoticed. After this short warm up introduction, the question and answer discussion was in its apex when one of the students remarked: ‘But we are just like you.’

The message the above story wants to communicate is that defining who the Europeans are, who ‘count as’ and who not, where to draw the lines of inclusion and exclusion is essentially a political struggle over objective/subjective borders. Here comes the place of the answer to the next sub-question, namely *How did the actors’ framing of the enlargement process affect the ‘negotiation game’?* By way of conclusion, the analysis of the discourse confirms the hypothesis that the applicants show the tendency to renounce what they perceive as East in themselves and shift the discursive border further east their country’s borderline, hence the narrative – *current self versus former self*. On the other hand, this has served to declare ‘likeness’ to the European identity and let the member states confirm their self-integrity and open-up to the enlargement possibility. Clearly confirming the hypothesis (*H3*), that actors who manage to propel a policy-idea (the security frame advanced by Sweden, Denmark and Italy) when the time pressure is great also manage to influence the agenda, and hence the final decision. As evident from the outcome of the run up to the Luxembourg summit, when there was a high media attention that created considerable pressure for coming up with a solution, the persuasion from the in-group members tipped the scales in favour of the ‘regatta approach’ and manage to move the negotiation game. Paraphrasing what one Central European diplomat comments ‘We’ll need a little bit of drama—just to make sure that people are paying attention.’ (The Economist, Dec 5th 2002)

‘Returning to the advice from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, I suggest that you begin at the beginning, continue till you reach the end, then stop’ (Wolcott, 2009), I want to bring this thesis to an end. By coming full circle again where I begin, I want to recognise in this conclusion that, although this chapter may mark the end of this research thesis, it also marks the opening chapter of my search for theoretical insight into the still uncharted territory of the meaning of the stories in the policymaking.
The rhetorical entrapment of the EU in the discourse of the 5th Eastward enlargement, the case of BG and RO

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